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WHEN THE ICC COMES KNOCKING, THE UNITED 
STATES SHOULD WELCOME IT WITH OPEN ARMS  
Brittney A. Dimond* 
Abstract: The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
requested approval to open a formal investigation into war crimes and crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed in Afghanistan since May 2003. If the investigation is 
approved, the United States  will have significant implications not only for 
relations going forward between the United States and the ICC, but also for the 
Three of the United 
States
include: (1) declining to cooperate with the ICC based on a denial of jurisdiction due to a 
lack of U.S. 
inadmissible to the Court pursuant to the doctrine of complementarity; or (3) contesting 
ding agreements made between the United States 
and Afghanistan. Each of these responses find footing in legal arguments centered on the 
tension between international jurisdiction and sovereignty. However, waiving 
jurisdictional challenges specific to this investigation, the United States has a fourth option: 
compliance. Although unlikely to actualize, this course would position the United States 
as a global leader for human rights, bolster any future efforts to enforce prosecution against 
international criminals, and provide much needed recourse to victims of war crimes.      
Cite as: Brittney A. Dimond, When the ICC Comes Knocking, the United States Should 
Welcome It with Open Arms, 28 WASH. INT L L.J. 181 (2019). 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The International Criminal Court (ICC ) is a treaty-based 
international organization centered around a permanent court that was 
established for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression. Advocates 
for the ICC contend that the Court is a vital tool that allows the international 
community to hold perpetrators of heinous crimes accountable for actions that 
might otherwise go unpunished.  
completed ten formal investigations resulting in 
three defendants being found guilty of their charged crime(s), six cases ending 
in either acquittal or dismissal, and one case currently on appeal.1 In addition, 
                                                 
*  Brittney A. Dimond is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Washington and is expected to graduate 
in June 2019. The author received a B.A. in Political Science and Communications from the University of 
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1  Situations Under Investigation, INT L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2018). 
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the ICC currently has eleven situations under investigation as well as eleven 
preliminary examinations pending before it.2  
One of these elven preliminary examinations that has spurred debate 
among the international community is the 
Fatou Bensouda, to the Pre-Trial Chamber to approve the initiation of a formal 
investigation into alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed 
in Afghanistan since May 2003.3 If the Pre-Trial Chamber grants this request, 
it will be significant for two reasons: first, it will be only the second 
investigation into a situation that occurred outside of Africa;4 and second, the 
investigation is likely to include, within its scope, allegations against 
American military and CIA personnel. 5  If the Afghanistan investigation 
moves forward, it may help ease criticism that the Court is biased against 
African countries;6 however, it would likely also trigger international dispute 
United States has not ratified the treaty 
that created the Court and has since rejected ICC claims of authority over U.S. 
persons.7 If the ICC pursues an investigation in Afghanistan that includes 
allegations against American officials, the United States
consequences not only for the individuals facing accusations, but also the 
international community at large.  
This comment begins with a brief background regarding the 
establishment of the ICC, the C pending 
Afghanistan investigation that might implicate American nationals. It then 
explores four possible options the United States could pursue in response to 
an ICC investigation, and considers the comparative strengths and weakness 
                                                 
2  Id.  
3  Preliminary Examinations, INT L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Preliminary-
Examinations.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). When, as in this case, the Prosecutor opens a preliminary 
examination proprio motu, on her own authority, instead of acting upon a request from a States Party or a 
-
investigation to begin. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
4  INT L CRIM. CT., supra note 1.  
5  INT L CRIM. CT.: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 
2016 43 50 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf.  
6  See Tessa Alleblas, Eamon Aloya, Geoff Dancy & Yvonne Dutton, Is the International 
Criminal Court Biased Against Africans? Kenyan Victims  Think So,  WASH. POST  (Mar. 6, 2017),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/06/is-the-international-criminal-court-
biased-against-africans-kenyan-victims-dont-think-so/. 
7  Steven Groves & Brett Schaefer, The ICC Investigation in Afghanistan Vindicates U.S. Policy 
Toward the ICC, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/report/the-icc-investigation-
afghanistan-vindicates-us-policy-toward-the-icc#_ftn7.  
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of each. This comment concludes that the correct course, although the most 
unlikely, is for the United States to comply  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.    
In the aftermath of World War II, the Allied nations held criminal trials 
imposing individual liability upon offenders, including military leaders and 
personnel, for the crimes committed during the conflict.8 Commentators point 
to the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals as a turning point that set the stage for 
the international community to recognize individual responsibility, instead of 
state accountability, for certain egregious crimes committed during times of 
war and peace. 9  During the Genocide Convention, the U.N. General 
Assembly recognized the need for a permanent international court to 
investigate and adjudicate certain categories of atrocities that had been 
recognized as international crimes.10 Following the Cold War, nations came 
together to negotiate the creation of such a court. 11  However, while 
negotiations for the ICC statute were underway, heinous crimes were being 
committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In response to these 
atrocities, the U.N. Security Council established ad hoc tribunals for each 
situation.12 Undeniably, these events played a role in the decision to convene 
the conference that established the ICC in Rome during the summer of 1998.13  
In July of 1998, a conference of 160 States established the first treaty-
based permanent international criminal court.14 In addition to instituting the 
ICC, the Rome Statute outlines the C diction, defines the crimes 
that fall within that jurisdiction, includes the al rules, and 
establishes the mechanisms for States to cooperate with the ICC.15 Unlike its 
predecessor courts, the ICC was created through a multilateral treaty and is 
                                                 
8  The Nuremberg Trial and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1945-1948), OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).  
9  INT L CRIM. CT., UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf. 
10  Id.  
11  Id.  
12  Id.  
13  Id.  
14  Id.  
15  Rome Statute art. 36, ¶ 1. 
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not an organ of the U.N.; as such, its jurisdictional force is rooted upon the 
consent of member parties . 16  
The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002 in accordance with 
the entry into force provision of Article 126.17 Although 120 states adopted 
the Rome Statute in 1988, informally establishing the court, only 60 countries 
ratified the statute when it entered into force in 2002.18 As of 2018, there were 
138 signatories and 123 States Parties to the treaty.19 Unlike States Parties, 
signatory members are not legally bound by the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and only agree to act in good faith 
20  At one point, there were 124 States Parties of the ICC; 
however, in 2017, Burundi became the first nation to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute. Since then, several other nations including Gambia, Russia, South 
Africa, and the Philippines have announced intentions to do the same but 
have yet to formally withdraw.21 Of the ICC members, [33] are African 
States, [19] are Asia-Pacific States, [18] are Eastern European States, [28] are 
Latin American or Caribbean States, and [25] are Western European States. 22  
Despite overwhelming support by many of -states 
and the United States initial key role as a negotiating party of the statute, the 
United States has taken extraordinary steps to exempt itself from the 
jurisdiction of the court. The United States was deeply involved in the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute in the 1990s; however, it ultimately voted 
against adoption at the 1998 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.23 
Since then, U.S. support of the ICC has waxed and waned with each 
administration. In 2000, President Clinton authorized the United States to sign 
the Rome Statute but did not submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and 
                                                 
16  Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005). 
17  Rome Statute art. 126.  
18  International Criminal Court Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/18/world/international-criminal-court-fast-facts/index.html.  
19  U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Dec. 13, 
2017), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10&chapter=18&clang=_en#bottom. 
20  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  
21  CNN, supra note 18. 
22  The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT L CRIM. CT, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/ 
states%20parties/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2018). 
23  See David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-
State in Peace, Security, and Justice, Statement on Creating an International Criminal Court (Aug. 31, 1998). 
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consent as is necessary for ratification.24 -
nited States from 
ICC jurisdiction.25 While the Obama Administration was more supportive of 
the ICC as demonstrated by its participation in ICC meetings, supporting a 
vote for a Security Council referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC, and 
turning two individuals over to the ICC for alleged crimes in Uganda and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo it did not re-sign the Rome Statute or 
seek ratification.26 The Trump administration has yet to directly address the 
subject of the U.S.-ICC relationship, except for the Draft Executive Order to 
establish a committee to consider cutting funding even though the United 
States does not fund the ICC and funding the Court is expressly illegal under 
the American Service Members Protection Act.27  
B.    
he drafters of the Rome Statute 
sought to balance a respect for state sovereignty with the desire to protect the 
inalienability of human rights and avenge violations of such rights.28 As such, 
the Court has a limited mandate to try individuals (rather than States), and to 
hold such persons accountable for the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole, namely the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.29  
The fourth crime the crime of aggression has been a tricky issue for 
the ICC since its inception.30 Although initially included as one of the crimes 
that the ICC had jurisdiction over, the parties to the treaty failed to agree on a 
definition for the crime and under what terms it could be brought.31 Without 
an agreed upon definition, the Court was unable to investigate allegations of 
                                                 
24  Bill Clinton, President of the U.S., Statement Authorizing the US Signing of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, Statement at Camp David (Dec. 31, 2000). 
25  
May 6, 2002) (transcript available from author). 
26  See generally, Obama Administration, AM. NGO COALITION FOR THE INT L CRIM. CT., 
https://www.amicc.org/obama-administration (last visited Dec. 9, 2017). 
27  Trump Administration, AM. NGO COALITION FOR THE INT L CRIM. CT., 
https://www.amicc.org/trump-administration (last visited Dec. 9, 2017). 
28  See Kielsgard, supra note 16. 
29  Rome Statute, art. 5; UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 9.  
30  Desmnd Davies, ICC Crime of Aggression Finally Activated, GHANA NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 30, 
2018), http://www.ghananewsagency.org/world/icc-crime-of-aggression-finally-activated-128060.  
31  Id.  
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crimes of aggression, 32 
Commentators saw the prolonged debate as a move by powerful states, many 
with a propensity for aggression against weaker states, to delay the process 
for as long as possible to further shield their conduct from repercussions.33 On 
the other hand, those that opposed including the crime of aggression within 
 argued that the looming threat of prosecution would 
have a chilling effect on coalition building between nations seeking to address 
massive humanitarian emergencies with military responses, especially in light 
of the increasing difficulty of securing Security Council authorization for such 
efforts given the often conflicting interests of voting nations.34  
Interestingly, a consensus on the definition of the crime was reached in 
2009. However, that definition was not included in a resolution for ratified 
until 2017 at the 16th Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute in New 
York.35 After the resolution passed, the current definition entered into force 
on July 17, 2018.36 However, the resolution is only applicable to ICC member 
states that ratified or accepted the Amendment to the Rome Statute, which at 
this time consists of only thirty-five states.37  
According to the Rome Statute, the Court secures its jurisdiction 
through the treaty-based consent of member states which grants the Court 
authority over the enumerated offenses.38 Such jurisdiction is distinct from 
that of universal jurisdiction, which relates to the ability and obligation of 
national courts to investigate and prosecute particularly egregious crimes
including all of the crimes enumerated within l scope.39 
                                                 
32  Alex Whiting, Crime of Aggression Activated at the ICC: Does it Matter?, JUST SECURITY, (Dec. 
19, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/49859/crime-aggression-activated-icc-matter/.  
33  Davies, supra note 30.   
34  See Whiting, supra note 32.  
35  Davies, supra note 30.  
36  Id. 
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of th  art. 8, ¶ 1.  
37  Davies, supra note 30.   
38  Rome Statute art. 12.  
39  Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction Prepared for the Sixth Committee of the United Nations 
General Assembly, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/19/basic-facts-
universal-jurisdiction.  
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Significantly, universal jurisdiction applies only to nations and is therefore 
not an available source of jurisdiction for the ICC.40 
In order for a case to be justiciable before the ICC, jurisdiction must be 
proper, which includes temporal, subject matter, and territorial jurisdiction 
elements.41 Therefore, in order for jurisdiction to be proper, the crimes in 
question must: (1) have been committed after the inception of the ICC or after 
the relevant State Party joined the ICC; (2) fall within the definition of at least 
one of the four expressed crimes; and (3) have been committed by a member 
42  
Under Article 13 of the Rome Statute, there are three ways an 
investigation may be initiated.43 Investigations may be referred to the Office 
of the Prosecutor (OTP) by either State Parties or the Security Council 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.44 In addition, 
the Prosecutor45 may initiate an investigation in respect to the relevant crimes, 
proprio motu, or at his or her own discretion, but under such circumstance the 
Rome Statute requires Pre-Trial Chamber approval to move forward.46 
C.   The Investigation 
On November 3, 2017, the Prosecutor for the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, 
announced her formal request for Pre-Trial 
Chamber to open an official investigation into war crimes and crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed in Afghanistan since May 2003. 47 This 
announcement came after the decade-long preliminary 
                                                 
40  Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression, 53 HARV. INT L L.J. 358, 
365 (2012). 
41  Laura Dickinson & Alex Whiting, Expert Q&A: The International Criminal Court
Afghanistan Probe and the US, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54276/backgr
ounder-icc-afghanistan-probe-us-expert-qa/.  
42  Rome Statute art. 12.  
43  Office of the Prosecutor, INT L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp (last visited, Nov. 5, 
2018).   
44  Rome Statute art. 13. 
45  The Office of the Prosecutor is an independent organ of the Court that is responsible for 
Deputy Prosecutor are elected by the Assembly of States Parties for a non-renewable nine-year term. The 
current Prosecutor is Ms. Fatou Bensouda from The Gambia. See Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 43.    
46  Id.; see also, Dickinson & Whiting, supra note 41.  
47  
Authorization to Commence an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Nov. 
3, 2017) (transcript available from author).  
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investigation into the situation.48 Although the ICC was established in 2002, 
Afghanistan did not accede to the Rome Statute until 2003; therefore, the ICC 
does not have the authority to investigate crimes committed in Afghanistan 
before the indicated dates.49  
If approved, the investigation will focus on alleged crimes committed 
by the Taliban, ISIS, Afghan security forces, warlords, the U.S.-led coalition, 
and others during the lengthy wars in Afghanistan.50 It was reported that the 
Court received over a million allegations of abuses and atrocities in relation 
to the proposed investigation.51 Although the details of the request have not 
been released, Bensouda has previously indicated that the investigation could 
include allegations of torture and misconduct by U.S. military forces in 
Afghanistan between 2003 and 2004, as well as at CIA facilities in Lithuania, 
Poland, and Romania, all of which are ICC state members.52  
Because the Prosecutor has proceeded proprio motu, on her own 
authority, instead of acting upon a request from a States Party or a Security 
Council request, -Trial Chamber must approve the 
P 53  No official deadline was given for the judges to 
; 54  however, close observers of the ICC 
consider approval very likely.55 Pursuant to Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute, 
the Pre- re is a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation after considering the same 
factors addressed by the Prosecutor in making her decision to initiate the 
request primarily jurisdiction, admissibility, and the interests of justice.56  
                                                 
48  Katherine Gallagher, The ICC Must Hold the US Accountable for Crimes in Afghanistan, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/16/icc-us-accountable-for-crimes-
afghanistan.  
49  Rome Statute art. 11(1). 
50  David Davenport, Will the International Criminal Court Prosecute American Over Afghanistan?, 
FORBES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2018/03/26/will-the-international-
criminal-court-prosecute-americans-over-afghanistan/.  
51  Id.  
52  INT L CRIM. CT., supra note 5. 
53  Rome Statute art. 13. 
54  James McAuley, ICC Prosecutor Seeks Probe into War Crimes Allegations Against U.S. 
Military, CIA in Afghanistan, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
asia_pacific/icc-prosecutor-seeks-probe-into-war-crimes-allegations-against-us-military-cia-in-afghanistan/ 
2017/11/20/e8ec73b8-ce1e-11e7-a87b-47f14b73162a_story.html.  
55  Kevin Jon Heller,  OPINIO JURIS 
(Nov. 3, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/11/03/otp-decides-to-investigate-the-situation-in-afghanistan/.   
56  Dickinson & Whiting, supra note 41. 
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At this stage, the Pre-Trial Chamber makes these determinations with 
respect to the situation as a whole, not necessarily with respect to each 
individual potential case.57 If the requirements to approve the investigation 
are satisfied by some of the potential cases within the situation, that would be 
sufficient to authorize the investigation into the entire situation. So even if 
there exist possible jurisdictional or admissibility challenges to particular 
potential cases within a situation, it is not necessary that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber resolve such issues at this stage or deny the investigation in its 
entirety. 58  Although, the Pre-Trial Chamber likely could, if it wished to, 
resolve such issues if they were formally raised.59  
In a statement given on December 8, 2017, at the 16th Session of the 
Assembly of State Parties, a representative for the United States reaffirmed 
the United States
nationals of States that are not parties to the Rome Statute, absent a UN 
60 The representative 
went on to formally object to the proposed investigation involving U.S. 
personal in the Afghanistan situation and to remind those in attendance that 
while the United States States 
P refusal to join the ICC and place its citizens under the 
61  
II. THE UNITED STATES  RESPONSE OPTIONS 
The United States has, since the founding of the Court, maintained its 
position that the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over Americans because the 
                                                 
57  Id. 
58  Id.  
59  Rome Statute art. 19, ¶¶ 4, 6. The Statute expressly permits states to weigh in at this stage only on 
the narrow issue of whether it is investigating and prosecuting the same persons for the same potential crimes 
for purposes of determining if the doctrine of complementarity precludes ICC jurisdiction. However, Rule 
 Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
Chamber may, if it considers it desirable for the proper determination of the case, invite or grant leave to a 
State, organization or person to submit, in writing or orally, any observation on any issue that the Chamber 
-trial Chamber would permit any 
state implicated by the proceedings, such as the United States, to submit its observations at any stage of the 
proceedings on any matter. Dickinson & Whiting, supra note 41. 
60  Statement on Behalf of the United States of America 16th Session of the Assembly of States 
Parties, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/united-
states-statement-international-criminal-court-icc-afghanistan-december-2017.pdf.  
61  Id.  
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United States has not ratified the Rome Statute.62 On the other hand, the ICC 
upholds its position that it does have jurisdiction over American  
conduct in Afghanistan because the latter is a member state that has, by 
acceding to the Rome Statute, granted the ICC jurisdiction over certain crimes 
committed within its territory.63 While it is uncertain if the Pre-Trial Chamber 
 to open an investigation regarding the 
conduct of American officials in Afghanistan or elsewhere, the United States 
would have to decide how to respond if such approval is attained.  
This paper evaluates four possible approaches the United States could 
take in its response to an ICC investigation: (1) refuse to cooperate with the 
ICC based on a denial of jurisdiction due to a lack of U.S. consent; (2) 
c  that the situation is inadmissible 
for the Court pursuant to the doctrine of complementarity; (3) r
jurisdiction as precluded by binding agreements made between the United 
States and Afghanistan; or (4) accede jurisdiction specific to this investigation 
and comply with ICC requests. Scholars and commentators consider the first 
three the more likely possibilities. This comment considers the varying legal 
legitimacy of each, after which this comment argues that instead of denying 
egal basis, the United 
States should comply with the investigation in order to best serve its political 
and humanitarian goals.     
A. Option 1: Deny Jurisdiction Based on a Lack of Consent 
obligations are based upon its expressed consent to be bound through 
ratification of agreed-upon commitments or a long-standing practice and 
observance among sovereign nations sufficient to create an international 
custom.64 If a state freely chooses to subject its citizens to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC by signing and ratifying the Rome Statute, then that is its choice.65 
                                                 
62  David Bosco, US Options for Responding to ICC Scrutiny in Afghanistan, LAWFARE (Feb. 23, 
2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-options-responding-icc-scrutiny-afghanistan.    
63  Id. (relying on Rome Statute art. 12, ¶ 2(a)). 
64  See Joshua Wood, What is Customary International Law, RULE OF LAW INSTITUTE OF AUSTRALIA 
(Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.ruleoflaw.org.au/what-is-customary-international-law/.  
65  Brett Schaefer, How the U.S. Should Respond to ICC Investigation into Alleged Crimes in 
Afghanistan, HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/how-the-us-should-
respond-icc-investigation-alleged-crimes-afghanistan. 
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The United States has not made that decision and as such, arguably should not 
be subject to ICC jurisdiction absent its consent.66  
This position, as historically relied upon by the United States, has 
limited support among the international community because most legal 
scholars believe that ICC member states are able to delegate to the Court the 
criminal jurisdiction states inherently have over their own territory. 67 
Additionally, there is an argument that by choosing to keep military personnel 
in the territory of a States Party to the ICC, 68  the United States tacitly 
consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC because, as one of the primary parties 
to the initial negotiations of the Rome Statute, the United States was cognizant 
of the C  including Article 12(2)(a) which 
provides for jurisdiction over all conduct occurring within the territory of a 
member state.69  
provisions, the United States has arguably implicitly indicated its recognition 
 legitimate jurisdiction over non-member states through state 
territorial jurisdiction delegation when it insisted upon a bilateral agreement 
with Afghanistan to allow the United States to maintain exclusive jurisdiction 
over U.S. military and supporting personnel working in Afghanistan.70 While 
accession to the Rome Statute, multiple agreements were re-negotiated in 
2014, as the NATO International Security Assistance Force mission was 
advise a
being arranged.71 The renewed agreements required that the United States 
maintained exclusive jurisdiction over any criminal conduct committed by its 
nationals as a precondition for continued military support.72 The demanded 
prerequisite suggests a recognition that without such an agreement American 
                                                 
66  See Kielsgard, supra note 16. 
67  Bosco, supra note 62.  
68  The Rome Statute went into effect in Afghanistan after the United States already had a military 
presence in the country; therefore, the Court only has jurisdiction over conduct occurring after May 2003 
even though U.S. personnel were present beginning in 2001.  
69  Rome Statute art. 12, ¶ 2(a). 
70  Schaefer, supra note 65. 
71  INT L SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. DEP T OF STATE, REPORT ON STATUS OF FORCE 
AGREEMENTS 42 (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf. 
72  Id.  
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officials could be subjected to Afghan jurisdiction or, perhaps, that such 
jurisdiction could be delegated to the ICC.  
However, even if the United States  Court could 
be interpreted as implicit consent to its jurisdiction, in light of the fact that the 
United States has not signed or ratified the Rome Statute, it is under no treaty 
or legal obligation to comply with the ICC prosecutor or investigation. 73 
Furthermore, the American Service-
extradition, or prosecution of any United States citizen or permanent resident 
alien by the International Cr 74 In order to avoid the possibility 
of inferred waivers of ASPA restrictions on U.S. cooperation with the ICC 
investigation, some commenters have recommended that the United States 
reject any ICC requests pertaining to the Afghanistan investigation.75 They 
argue that cooperating with the ICC investigation could give the impression 
that the United States  over 
this investigation.76  
In addition, those advocating for the United States comply 
suggest that the United States should remind all governments with which it 
has Article 98 agreements that they are prohibited from surrendering U.S. 
persons to the Court or to any third party that has the intent to surrender U.S. 
persons to the Court. 77  The United States began negotiating Article 98 
agreements sometimes referred to as bilateral immunity agreements or 
bilateral non-surrender agreements in 2002 and has concluded at least one 
hundred such agreements.78 Further, in order to avoid tacit endorsement of the 
ICC legitimacy, these commentators also advise that the United States 
reassess its support for the ICC.79 While, as previously noted, the United 
States has never been a member state of the Rome Statute, it has supported 
the Court in various ways, including voting for Security Council referrals of 
situations in Sudan and Libya to the ICC.80  Moving forward, if the United 
States pursues this route, it would have to ensure its relationship and 
                                                 
73  Rome Statute art. 87. 
74  22 U.S.C. § 7423(f) (2002).  
75  Schaefer, supra note 65. 
76  Id.  
77  Id. 
78   International Criminal Court - Article 98 Agreements Research Guide, GEORGETOWN L. LIB.  
http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/article_98 (last visited Dec. 17, 2017).  
79  Schafer, supra note 65. 
80  Id. 
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interactions with the Court could not be interpret
jurisdiction.81  
Without assistance or cooperation from the United States in its 
investigation, there is a chance that the Prosecutor will be unable to develop 
enough information to bring formal charges against American officials.82 At 
the very least, ignoring the investigation until formal charges have been 
pressed would allow the United States to defer a decision on how to respond 
until it no longer had a choice.83 The delay and defer course of action allows 
the United States to avoid any diplomatic reverberations that may result from 
a head-on confrontation with the ICC, which would be especially 
advantageous if the investigation ultimately does not result in any formal 
charges and the issue of jurisdiction could be adjourned for another day.84  
However, by simply ignoring the investigation, the United States puts 
itself at risk of the ICC interpreting its muted response as evidence of an 
acquiescence to jurisdiction. 85  The Rome Statute 
specifies that if a State wishes to challenge the , it shall 
86 If the United States does 
not raise a challenge in the near future, it risks that future challenges could be 
considered waived. However, note that the individuals in question would still 
retain their ability to raise jurisdictional challenges until after they are 
formally charged and a trial has commenced.87  
The decision to delay and defer in response to the initiation of an 
investigation by the ICC based on a denial of ICC jurisdiction over the 
situation at hand would be contingent on the United S  confidence that 
the probability of formal charges being pressed against American officials is 
minimal.  If such a conclusion were reached, the strategy would allow for the 
United States to maintain a friendly, though minimalistic, relationship with 
                                                 
81  Id.   
82  Bosco, supra note 62. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. 
85  Id.  
86  Rome Statute art. 19, ¶ 5. 
87  Note that Article 19 paragraph 4 states, 
are no guidelines for what would be considered an exceptional circumstance. Rome Statute art. 19, ¶ 4. 
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the Court, which has broadly served U.S. interests by addressing mass 
atrocities around the world.88  
B. Option 2: Challenge Jurisdiction Based on the Doctrine of 
Complementarity   
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC must respect the doctrine of 
complementarity in regards to domestic jurisdiction.89 This means a case is 
inadmissible unless the states with domestic jurisdiction over the situation are 
unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute the situation.90 Article 18 of the 
Rome Statute specifies that, notification, 
a State may inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its 
nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts which 
91 In her statement announcing the decision to pursue 
the investigation at issue, the Prosecutor noted: 
In undertaking this work, if authorised by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
my Office will continue to fully respect the principle of 
complementarity, taking into account any relevant genuine 
national proceedings, including those that may be undertaken 
even after an investigation is authorised, within the Rome Statute 
framework.92 
Indicating that, even though the United States missed the one-month deadline 
prescribed by the statute, if the United States conducted its own investigation 
or could demonstrate that it has already adequately investigated the conduct 
at issue, the case against Americans would likely still be considered 
inadmissible.93  
Therefore, one recommendation for how the United States could 
respond to the possibility of an investigation is for the United States to initiate, 
or re-open, investigations into the 
                                                 
88  Bosco, supra note 62. 
89  Rome Statute art. 1. 
90  Rome Statute art. 17. 
91  Rome Statute art. 18, ¶ 2. 
92   INT L CRIM. CT., supra note 1.   
93  Jennifer Trahan, 
Afghanistan, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 5, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/11/05/its-high-time-for-the-us-to-
conduct-complementarity-as-to-crimes-in-afghanistan/.   
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situation. 94  The United States has previously investigated allegations of 
detainee abuse in Afghanistan and the other pertinent states. Indeed, in 2006 
it was reported that the United States 
investigations into allegations of mistreatment, and more than 250 individuals 
[had] 95 According to the report, 
the individuals found liable have been court-martialed, served prison terms up 
to ten years, received formal reprimands, or were separated from the 
military.96 
In light of the fact that the Prosecutor 
97  that U.S. armed forces and CIA members 
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity that deserve an ICC 
investigation, it is to be presumed that the United States
investigation did not incorporate the same conduct at issue or did not satisfy 
the requirements of being endently or impartially [and] in a 
manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice. 98 Otherwise those investigations would have 
satisfied the complementarity exemption making the situation, at least in 
regards to the United States inadmissible.99  
Many commentators argue that triggering the doctrine of 
complementarity jurisdiction by commencing a domestic investigation is the 
United States  best response option because it would ensure that to the extent 
U.S. nationals are implicated, such wrongdoings are addressed within the U.S. 
legal system. 100  As comme he U.S. has 
credible and effective military and civilian investigative capacities and court 
systems that should be utilized 101 Others have suggested this would also be 
the best case scenario for the ICC because it would avoid a showdown 
between the Court and the United States that could severely tarnish the 
legitimacy of the Court.102 However, such an investigation would likely have 
                                                 
94  Id.  
95  Opening 
Statement for U.S. Hearing at Committee Against Torture (May 5, 2006) (transcript available from author). 
96  Second Periodic Report of the United States to the Committee Against Torture (CAT), U.S. DEP T 
OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/c14907.htm (last updated July 25, 2007). 
97  Rome Statute art. 13.  
98  Rome Statute art. 17, ¶ 2(c). 
99  Rome Statute art. 17, ¶ 1(c). 
100  Trahan, supra note 93. 
101  Id.; see also, Rome Statute art. 17, ¶ 2(c). 
102  Id.  
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to include the prosecution of senior officials in order to satisfy the 
complementarity requirement, a move the United States is highly unlikely to 
make.103  
C. Option 3: Refute Jurisdiction as Precluded by Status of Force  
Agreements with Afghanistan 
 As previously discussed, pursuant to the doctrine of complementarity, 
the ICC may only assert jurisdiction if the relevant states are unwilling or 
unable to pursue the alleged crimes.104 
forward with the investigation against American officials indicates that she 
believes both the United States and Afghanistan are unwilling or unable to 
investigate and adjudicate the challenged conduct through their domestic 
processes, or that such processes have been inadequate. 105  Although the 
United States asserts it has conducted independent investigations and 
prosecutions regarding the conduct at issue, until more details are released 
relating the specifics of the Prose allegations it is unclear if those 
processes involved the same conduct.106  
Furthermore, due to several multilateral and bilateral agreements, the 
government of Afghanistan has extremely limited legal jurisdiction over U.S. 
officials and services members, which makes it unlikely that Afghanistan 
would have the authority to pursue the contested conduct pursuant to its own 
jurisdiction.107 One such agreement is the NATO Status of Force Agreement 
(SOFA). SOFA covers the United States  mission to train, advise, and assist 
Afghan forces and provides immunity to NATO forces from criminal 
prosecution.108 In addition, the United States and Afghanistan negotiated a 
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that provides for the continuation of an 
earlier U.S.-Afghan SOFA. This agreement granted military and civilian 
humanitarian and civic assistance, military training and exercises, and other 
                                                 
103  Mark Kersten, 
for the Court, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Nov. 17, 2016) https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/11/17/whatever-
happens-the-iccs-investigation-into-us-torture-in-afghanistan-is-a-win-for-the-
court/ (explaining that although high-level officials including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, or John Yoo 
would likely fall wit tigation, the prospect of the United States allowing for 
their surrender to The H - ).  
104  Rome Statute art. 17. 
105  Id.  
106  See Trahan, supra note 93. 
107  INT L SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 71.  
108  Id.  
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rom criminal prosecution by Afghan authorities, as well 
as immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction except with respect to 
acts performed outside the course of their duties.109  
Thus, in light of the obligations created by these agreements, the 
Afghan government is contractually unable to pursue the alleged crimes 
because it has released its claim to jurisdiction.110 In an attempt to shield 
Americans from foreign jurisdiction, the United States unintendedly opened 
the door for the ICC to obtain jurisdiction over the situation at issue. As made 
explicit in the Rome Statute, the ICC may only assert its jurisdiction when 
states which have jurisdiction over the issue are unwilling or unable to 
genuinely prosecute. 111  Afghanistan, as the territory where the conduct 
occurred, is the primary state that would absent binding agreements have 
original jurisdiction over the situation at issue. 112  Furthermore, because 
Afghanistan is a member party of the Rome Statute, the ICC has a stronger 
claim to jurisdiction based prosecute 
the accused actors is the result of previously negotiated agreements instead of 
an informed decision to choose not to prosecute.113 In accordance with their 
treaty agreements, Afghanistan cannot proceed with a prosecution against 
Americans covered by either SOFA. Such a circumstance likely contributed 
to the Prosecutor  conclusion that Afghanistan  inability to prosecute did 
not bar the ICC from gaining jurisdiction.    
However, while the United States  SOFA agreements with Afghanistan 
against the ICC maintaining legitimate jurisdiction. Professor Michael 
Newton of Vanderbilt Law School advanced an argument against ICC 
jurisdiction resting upon the legal theory that when Afghanistan entered into 
                                                 
109  Id.  
110  Rome Statute art. 17. 
111  Id.   
112  
International Studies: American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court (May 6, 2002) 
(expressing the United States gn nations have the authority to try non-citizens 
 
113  Rome Statute art. 17. 
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the SOFAs with the United States in 2002, it ceded criminal jurisdiction over 
Americans and therefore cannot delegate that jurisdiction to the ICC.114  
The ICC treaty entered into force for Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, after 
it deposited its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute on February 10, 
2003.115 rred after it 
voluntarily constrained the scope of its territorial jurisdiction over American 
nationals.116  
criminal jurisdiction over U.S. nationals pursuant to several SOFAs with the 
United States, Afghanistan cannot lawfully delegate its territorial jurisdiction 
to the ICC.117 
the nationals of non-
territoriality. 118  Therefore, if Afghanistan no longer possesses criminal 
jurisdiction over the American nationals at issue, it is precluded from 
transferring such jurisdiction to the ICC.119  
understanding that the ICC authority is 
exclusively derived from the delegation of state jurisdiction.120 However, such 
an assumption is not wholly accepted within the international legal or 
scholarly community Carsten Stahn, a 
professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice at Leiden 
University, points out an alternative model of how the ICC derives its 
jurisdiction.121 Stahn argues that ICC jurisdiction is actually 
122 For 
more than three centuries, states have exercised universal jurisdiction: a 
principle that holds that international law enables each state to assert 
jurisdiction over certain crimes, regardless of where they were committed or 
                                                 
114  Michael A. Newton, How the International Criminal Court Threatens Treaty Norms, 49 VAND. J. 
TRANSNATIONAL L. 407 (2015). 
115  Rome Statute art. 126, ¶ 2; see generally COAL. FOR THE INT L CRIM. CT., FACT SHEET: 
AFGHANISTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Nov. 21, 2017), 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/sites/default/files/cicc_documents/ciccfactsheet_afghanistan_icc_0.pdf.  
116  Newton, supra note 114, at 407. 
117  Id. at 408. 
118  Id.  
119  Id.  
120  Id. at 407. 
121  Carsten Stahn, Response: The ICC, Pre-Existing Jurisdictional Treaty Regimes, and the Limits of 
the Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet Doctrine A Reply to Michael Newton, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 443 
(2015). 
122  Id. at 446 48. 
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by whom, on behalf of the international community. 123  Traditionally, 
universal jurisdiction covered mostly acts of piracy, but it has since been 
extended to include genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity the 
very crimes adjudicated by the ICC.124 Therefore, Stahn concludes, the ICC 
derives its jurisdiction from universal jurisdiction, rather than by a delegation 
of domestic jurisdiction, United 
States exclusive jurisdiction over its nationals does not preclude the ICC from 
exercising jurisdiction over the core crimes covered by universal 
jurisdiction.125 However, the principle of universal jurisdiction was rejected 
during the Rome debates and was not included in the Rome Statute leaving an 
avenue for the United States to proffer the absence of Afghanistan jurisdiction 
as a basis for the lack of ICC jurisdiction.126  
In order to substantiate the United States
jurisdiction over its nationals based on the SOFAs it has with Afghanistan, 
either the United States or Afghanistan must provide the agreement to the 
Prosecutor for consideration.127 The SOFA signed between Afghanistan and 
the United States is confidential and Afghanistan deposited its instrument of 
accession to the Rome Statute without mention of the SOFA; further, 
Afghanistan accepted the treaty without reservations to the exercise of ICC 
jurisdiction over crimes listed in the Rome Statute committed on Afghanistan 
soil after May 2003.128  
 
person or a person for whom a warrant of arrest has been issued, a State that 
has jurisdiction over a case on the grounds of complementarity, or a State from 
which acceptance of jurisdiction is required.129 While the United States could 
bring a jurisdictional challenge on basis of complementarity, it could not raise 
the argument that the SOFAs bar prosecution because the United States does 
not qualify as a State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under 
                                                 
123  Dalila V. Hoover, Universal Jurisdiction Not So Universal: A Time to Delegate to the International 
Criminal Court 5 (Cornell Law Sch. Paper No. 52 2011), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1081&context=lps_clacp.  
124  Id. at 6. 
125  Stahn, supra note 121, at 449. 
126  Luis Moreno Ocampo, , L. FARE BLOG 
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/iccs-afghanistan-investigation-missing-option.  
127  Under Rome Statute art. 15, ¶ 2, the Prosecutor may receive information from reliable sources he or 
she deems appropriate.  
128  Ocampo, supra note 126. 
129  Rome Statute arts. 12, 19. 
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Article 12  
a States Parties, because that is where the alleged conduct occurred.130  
A challenge to the admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction of the Court 
must take place prior to or at the commencement of the trial;131 before there 
has been a confirmation of the charges, the challenges must be referred to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber.132 As such, one of the United States  options in response 
to the investigation is to ensure that a party capable of raising the challenge 
presents the assertion 133  that the ICC lacks jurisdiction over the accused 
Americans based on the legal theory that the SOFAs between the United 
States and Afghanistan preclude the ICC from asserting jurisdiction.134 Such 
a challenge would need to be made to the Pre-Trial Chamber immediately in 
order to prevent the Court from moving forward with the investigation.135  
D. Option 4: Comply with the Investigation  
One of the United States
or media discussion is compliance. This option has been mostly ignored for 
good reason analysts agree that the United States will never cooperate with 
an ICC investigation against its armed forces.136 The appointment of John 
Bolton, a longtime critic of the ICC, as National Security Advisor practically 
cements such predictions.137 Washington actors, including Bolton, looking to 
tell the 
Court 138 
                                                 
130  Id. Assuming the ICC is exercising proper jurisdiction on the basis of Afghanistan being a party to 
the Statute and the condu g to the Rome Statute, 
the United States  
131  Id. art. 19 ¶¶ 4, 6. 
132  Id. 
133  See id. art. 12. 
134  See Newton, supra note 114. 
135  See Rome Statute art. 12. 
136  See Lisa Clifford, Afghanistan and the ICC: A B First Step, But a Long Road Ahead, IRIN 
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2018/01/23/afghanistan-and-icc-brave-first-step-long-
road-ahead; see also Marissa Melton & Carla Babb, 
Considers Investigation, VOA NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.voanews.com/a/pentagon-international-
criminal-court-in
States).  
137  Clifford, supra note 136.   
138  Davenport, supra note 50.  
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However, while such a strategy has the potential to shine a light on the 
feebleness of an international court that lacks global participation or teeth 
sharp enough to have an effective bite, this stance could backfire for the 
United States.139 The Court, with full knowledge of the United States
regarding its jurisdiction, has taken brave steps to fulfill its statutory duties
it is 
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of 140 If the ICC 
is unable to properly investigate or prosecute Americans, the blame will fall 
at the feet of Washington, not the ICC. But, in addition to avoiding blame for 
a failed investigation, the United States should comply with the Court in an 
effort to reset its human rights agenda and honor its founding commitment to 
justice.141 If the investigation results in allegations and indictments against 
American actors, the U.S. 
efforts to bring justice to victims of war crimes. 
 A missing component of the discussion regarding the United States
options in response to this investigation is the necessity of U.S. compliance 
for victims to access justice. The ICC is unique among international criminal 
tribunals in that victims and those with  interests [or that] are affect
 by 
the proceedings determine
witnesses.142 The Statute explicitly provides for the possibility of victims to 
make representations when the Prosecutor, as in this case, seeks propio moto 
authorization to open an investigation. 143  The Court received 245 
representations on behalf of more than 700 thousand victims by the January 
31, 2018 deadline for voluntary victim representations related to the Afghan 
investigation. These representations are critical to the Pre-
                                                 
139  See Clifford, supra note 136.   
140  Rome Statute pmbl. 
141   human rights agenda has floundered in recent decades: it has the largest 
incarcerated population in the world, which is often attributed to excessive and discriminatory sentencing 
practices; police continue to kill black people at disproportionate rates compared to their overall share of the 
population; drastic cuts in refugee programs and dramatic increases in deportations has resulted in family 
separation and in many cases an inability for individuals to escape violent or dire situations in their home 
countries; and the creation and continuance of the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay where the United States 
continues to hold thirty-one men at the facility who have been there for over a decade without being charged. 
See United States: Events of 2017, HUM. RTS. WATCH: WORLD REP. 2018, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2018/country-chapters/united-states (last visited Aug. 18, 2018).  
142  Rome Statute art. 68, ¶ 3; Participation: The Participation of Victims in International Criminal 
Court Proceedings, REDRESS, 2012, VICTIMS  RTS. WORKING GROUP http://www.vrwg.org/victims-
rights/participation (last visited Apr. 24, 2018).  
143  Rome Statute art. 15, ¶ 3. 
202 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 28 NO. 1 
 
 
 
decision because in order to move forward with a full investigation and 
possible prosecution, the Pre-Trial Chamber must be convinced that such a 
decision is in the interest of justice.144 
145 Therefore, it is important for the Court to know how many victims 
agree with prosecution, but also, how many victims would not want the 
prosecution to occur. Of the representations made on behalf of hundreds of 
thousand victims, just two families, comprising 20 victims, and 30 other 
individuals said they did not want an investigation.146 
The United States has positioned itself within the international 
community in such a spot that any course of action other than compliance 
would harm its reputation as one of the traditional champions of human rights. 
As an integral player in war crime tribunals147 and peacekeeping missions,148 
the United States puts itself out as a defender of personal accountability and 
justice for victims of war crimes. However, its continued hypocritical stance 
as an enforcer against all but its own crimes has taken a toll on the United 
States 149 Take for example the pressure the United 
States put on Balkan countries to turn over indicted person to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Two weeks after 
requiring Serbia to demonstrate full compliance with the ICTY in order to 
receive further U.S. assistance, the United States suspended military aid due 
foreign jurisdiction similar to the one currently in force between 
Afghanistan and America. 150  In response, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran 
                                                 
144  Rome Statute arts. 15, 53; Ehsan Qaane, Afghan Victims of War Crimes Want Investigation: 
Hundreds of thousands apply to ICC, AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.afghanistan-
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145  I  CRIM. CT.: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON VICTIMS  PARTICIPATION 
(2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/Policy_Paper_on_Victims_Participation_April_2010.pdf.  
146  Qaane, supra note 144.  
147  Primary examples include the Nuremberg trials and the ad hoc tribunals created in the aftermath of 
the tragedies in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, as well as the role it played during the founding of the ICC. 
See Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy of Nuremberg, 4 L.J. I  CRIM. JUST. 830 (2006). 
148  See, e.g., Mark Kersten, When an Alleged War Criminal Walks into a US Embassy S Me 
to the ICC,  JUST. CONFLICT (Mar. 19, 2013), https://justiceinconflict.org/2013/03/19/when-a-war-criminal-
walks-into-a-us-embassy-and-says-take-me-to-the-icc/. 
149  See, e.g., Chris Patten, Why Does America Fear this Court?, WASH. POST (July 9, 2002), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/07/09/why-does-america-fear-this-
court/3b4ed6c8-d502-4b58-af4c-85a9f6326baf/. 
150  Colum Lynch, U.S. Confronts EU on War Crimes Court: Immunity Pact Issue Threatens Relations, 
WASH. POST, June 10, 2003, at A17. 
January 2019 When the ICC Comes Knocking 203 
people that on the one hand we will sign a bilateral agreement with the United 
States in which we agree to protect their citizens, while at the same time we 
151 The more vociferously 
negative the U.S. response is to an investigation involving its own citizens, 
the to the 
detriment of the reputation of the United States.  
As a nation that calls for the prosecution of war criminals before the 
Court, conditions foreign aid on human rights, and even engages in military 
intervention based on human rights violations, the United States must 
demonstrate that it holds to its convictions even against its own citizens. 
Former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer said 
in a speech at the Centre of Human Rights in South Africa that the United 
States bilities and . . . 152 
f a nation, whether a party or not to the Rome 
Treaty, acts irresponsibly and wages massive crimes against its own people or 
those of another nation, then we have no interest in permitting such a nation 
to enjoy any special privilege; let that nation's war criminals stand trial before 
the ICC. 153  The United States
investigation would weaken its authority to oppose torture and other abuses 
abroad and would set an example that countries will point to in the future to 
justify obstruction.  
In addition to political and moral justifications for compliance, in this 
circumstance,  would also likely be 
the most strategic position the United States could take in order to preserve 
the validity of their arguments against joining the ICC.  
One of the United States  most frequently cited justifications for 
refusing to become a State Party of the Rome Statute is the fear that Americans 
would become vulnerable as political targets for prosecution and such would 
chill the United States  world.154 In December 
of 2014, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein released 
                                                 
151  E.U. Candidates Resist U.S. Pressure over International Criminal Court, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, July 
2, 2003.  
152  David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at- The Global 
Challenge of Establishing Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity Remarks, Remarks Before Centre 
for Human Rights, University of Pretoria (Aug. 22, 2000) (transcript available from author). 
153  Id. 
154  Anne K. Heindel, The Counterproductive Bush Administration Policy Toward the International 
Criminal Court, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 345, 345 (2004). 
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-
detention and interrogation program
investigation.155 Declassified portions of the Senate Summary made public 
include a redacted 499-page report that describes in detail many of the 
interrogation methods used on CIA detainees. 156  These methods included 
eping detainees 
 and 
waterboarding.157 While the Obama administration asserted that it conducted 
a criminal investigation of the CIA program, the investigation was closed 
without questioning current or former detainees and did not result in any 
criminal charges. 158  Considering that 
variety of actors instead of solely Americans and that the United States was 
concerned by the same conduct at issue enough to conduct its own 
investigation, the potential probe by the ICC is clearly not one motivated by 
political pretext. 
 As such, compliance would signal that under circumstances in which 
the Court is working as intended and as openly supported by the United 
States the United States will work to further their aligned goals. 159 
Moreover, because the Rome Statute provides for non-members to waive 
jurisdictional challenges for specific investigations while maintaining claims 
to sovereignty otherwise,160 if the Court was ever used as a political tool 
against the United States, the United States
would be made stronger by their previous cooperation.        
                                                 
155  S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 112th Cong., Committee Study of the Central Intelligence 
 (Declassification Revisions 2014), 
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/7/c/7c85429a-ec38-4bb5-968f-
289799bf6d0e/D87288C34A6D9FF736F9459ABCF83210.sscistudy1.pdf.  
139   Laura Pitter, No More Excuses, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/01/no-
more-excuses/roadmap-justice-cia-torture (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).  
157  Id.  
158  Id.  
159  
(ASPA). 22 U.S.C. § 7423. Enacted in 2002, under the Bush administration, ASPA prohibits U.S. courts, 
agencies, and government entities from cooperating with the ICC.159 Given that the statute sharply limits the 
U.S. 
are under investigation, in order for U.S. actors to comply with an investigation without domestic legal 
consequences, Congress would have to amend or repeal ASPA. Julian Bava & Kiel Ireland, The American 
th the International 
Criminal Court, 12 EYES ON THE ICC 2016/2017 1, at 1 28. 
160  Rome Statute art. 12, ¶ 3.  
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Additionally, U.S. compliance would allow for greater control over 
how, and in some ways what, information or evidence is provided to the Court. 
This would not be the first time the ICC conducted an investigation from the 
outside. The Sudanese government similarly resisted the 2005 investigation 
into the Sudan/Darfur situation.161 This was the first situation to be referred to 
the ICC by the United Nations Security Council, and the first investigation in 
the territory of a non-State Party to the Rome Statute.162 Alex Whiting, a 
professor at Harvard Law School and a former senior official in the 
P when 
does not have 
163  
To date, not a single high-level U.S. official from civilian leadership, 
military, CIA, or private contractor has been prosecuted for war crimes or 
crimes against humanity.164 The ICC investigation could finally change that
bringing an end to the impunity U.S. officials have enjoyed and, critically, 
some measure of redress to victims of the U.S. torture program. 165  A 
successful investigation, one that is not foreclosed by the United States
refusal to cooperate, would send a clear message to victims of egregious 
crimes that they have recourse through an independent and impartial process, 
and to perpetrators of such crimes, that no one is above the law. Furthermore, 
if the United States is confident that its investigation into the allegations was 
sufficient and that American nationals did not violate international law, then 
it should be confident the ICC will, after a robust and unobstructed 
investigation, come to the same conclusion. Cooperating with an ICC 
investigation, regardless of the outcome, bolsters the United States
within the international community because it signals a commitment to the 
rule of law and sets a new tone for what is expected from nations States 
Parties and nonmembers alike that harbor war criminals.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
If the Pre-Trial Chamber approves the P
formal investigation into the situation in Afghanistan and such an 
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investigation includes allegations against American officials, the United 
States response will likely play a critical role in 
jurisdictional authority moving forward. Three of the United States likely 
response options based on its past and current relationship with the ICC 
include: (1) declining to cooperate with the ICC based on a denial of 
jurisdiction due to a lack of U.S. consent; (2) negating 
on the basis that the situation is inadmissible to the Court pursuant to the 
doctrine of complementarity; or (3) contesting 
precluded by binding agreements made between the United States and 
Afghanistan. Each of these responses find footing in legal arguments centered 
on the tension between international jurisdiction and sovereignty. However, 
waiving jurisdictional challenges specific to this investigation, the United 
States has a fourth option: compliance. Although unlikely to actualize, this 
course would position the United States as a global leader for human rights, 
bolster any future efforts to enforce prosecution against international 
criminals, and provide much needed recourse to victims of war crimes.      
While a formal investigation into the Afghanistan situation would not 
be limited to American conduct and many of the atrocities at issue were 
carried out by non-U.S. actors, if Americans violated international law, they 
should be held accountable and the United States should not shield them by 
refusing to comply with the Court. Such refusal, based on any legal or political 
argument regarding jurisdiction, tarnishes the United States
the international community and weakens its legitimacy to participate in 
future efforts to vindicate the rights of victims of similar crimes.  
 
 
 
